Bristlemouth: A Value Investing Blog
April 7, 2009

‘Too Big to Fail’ Brings Investors Unstuck

‘Too Big to Fail’ Brings Investors Unstuck

I recently read an engrossing instalment of The HCM Market Letter, an American subscription newsletter written by the outspoken Michael Lewitt. The last page of the 1 April issue included the depressing share price graphs of five once-giant companies that have since been bailed out by the US Government – as Lewitt put it, five ‘quasi-public companies being kept on life support by the government trailing little stubs of public stock behind them like turds in the dust’.

too-big-to-fail

Although I’ve been following the news closely over the past few years, it still shocked me to reflect on the fact that the world’s once largest bank, Citigroup, its once largest automaker, General Motors, its once largest insurance business, AIG, and the two American mortgage giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, now attracted such a metaphor.

For years, these businesses had been considered ‘too big to fail’, an assumption that gave stockmarket investors a high degree of comfort. That assumption of being too big to fail proved spot on, with the US government diving in with assistance at almost every turn of this financial crisis (although General Motors may prove the exception). Yet it’s meant diddly-squat for equity investors in these five companies who’ve lost substantially everything they had invested.

So what went wrong? The answer, I think, is that many investors unknowingly were making a second assumption, one that proved dead wrong. They correctly assumed that the US government wouldn’t let these businesses sink, that they were too important to the financial system and the economy to not bail out. But investors then made the assumption that this implicit guarantee made the equity of these companies safe, or at least much safer than most stocks.

Of course, it all seems so obvious with hindsight. Why should the government put a cent of its money at risk until after the equity holders have been completely wiped out? But this second, malignant assumption was so commonplace, and it caught so many investors out, that it’s worth considering what other assumptions investors are making today that they may regret tomorrow.

Too big to fail Down Under

Terms such as ‘too big to fail’ have been used for a long time in association with Australia’s big four banks. Bankers regularly referred to the ‘implicit government guarantee’ of our banks, a guarantee that became explicit late last year. It was once a commonly held belief that this implicit guarantee made the shares of the big four banks ‘safe’. This assumption has certainly taken a beating in the past year, a result of the American experience, but we propose taking it out back and shooting it. When push comes to shove, governments care about depositors, not shareholders, and rightfully so.

Telstra’s magnificent monopoly

This is another assumption that’s taken a knock in recent years. But many shareholders still consider Telstra’s local loop an unbreakable monopoly. But it is already subject to gradual erosion – as customers move to wireless – and potentially revolutionary change from new technologies. The situation is much the same for hearing implant maker Cochlear, a company that is likely to maintain its dominant global market share unless an unexpected new technology completely revolutionises the business.

Property may go sideways but it won’t fall significantly

There are many reasons why property prices, particularly residential property, might not fall over the coming years. But most of those reasons – such as ‘everyone needs a roof over their head’ and ‘they’re not building any more land’ – also held true in the United States and United Kingdom prior to their bubbles bursting. We don’t rule out the possibility that Australia might be different. But we think it’s important to realise that there’s also a possibility that Australian residential property will fall significantly over the coming years, and we don’t want to make any investments that are overly reliant on the assumption of invincibility holding true. That leads us to a related assumption.

Australian banks are the strongest in the world

This is a relatively new one, but it’s gained a lot of ground amongst investors and politicians, and has come about because our banks have proven quite resilient during the financial crisis. It’s natural to draw the conclusion that this was the result of brilliant management or regulatory oversight. But we’d also suggest it is heavily reliant on the previous assumption, that property prices won’t fall significantly. Australian property has held up much better than in other western nations, which has helped our banks greatly. If this situation changes our banks might not look so comparably strong.

Consciously or otherwise, stockmarket investors make a great many assumptions in their attempts to separate investment wheat from chaff. Unavoidably, as Tatts Group and Tabcorp shareholders have painfully learned, many will prove false. But we can do lot to protect ourselves by thinking through those big, commonly held beliefs – they’re the ones that seem to do the most damage.

Comments

James
April 7, 2009

Great article Gareth, I really liked your link bewtween Australian banks being the strongest in the world and our proprty prices not having yet fallen significantly. Nice work..

April 7, 2009

On the possibility of significant house price falls, I recommend Steve Keen's latest post at http://www.debtdeflation.com/blogs/2009/04/06/steve-keens-debtwatch-no-3...

April 7, 2009

When Australia's banks are the strongest in the world, something is very wrong. Great article Gareth, I also agree with Jame's comments.

Dave
April 7, 2009

"When push comes to shove, governments care about depositors, not shareholders, and rightfully so." Ahh (wistful sigh) .. if only this were actually the case, Gareth. The TARP, TALF, PPIP, TSLF. and dozen-or-so similarly acroynmed funds have shown that the US Government for one is willing to put incredible resources on the line so as to keep bond-holders whole and avoid haircuts/wipeouts for shareholders. Ir seems that shareholders and bondholders win FIRST, deposit holders next (only because of the existence of FDIC, born of the GD) and the taxpayer takes the losses. Krugman is right - profits are privatised and losses are socialised. Who can say how different (if any) the model would be here?

As for "strongest in the world" banks, I agree with your concerns. Property price declines are not a matter of "if", but "when". Markets cannot remain permanently irrational in the face of global economic contagion and mounting local job losses. We are merely 12 months or so behind the US and UK in the cycle. This is inherently a "bullwhip effect" (from supply chain economics) - the US and UK have been at the demand end of the chain, and we have been at the supply end (predominantly), with China and India in the middle. Aussie banks obtain 2/3 of their mortgage funding from now-closed o/s credit markets, and with funding for the entire loan book needing to roll-over every 3-4 years (on average) it won't be long until banks are showing the strains of credit rationing - falling LVRs, tightening lending criteria and so on. This will impact loans and lead to a (probably gradual, but possibly more sudden) fall in property prices. With P/E (prices to average annual earnings) trading at historical highs (and higher than the US or UK property markets during their peaks) we could be staring down the gunbarrel of a 50% or greater property price decline over the next 3-5 years.

Now that's a "stress test" scenario I would like to see modelled. Ahmed and his Rudd-bank don't have the capital to prevent this looming train-wreck, and that capital sure isn't available on wholesale debt markets either.

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