JB Hi-Fi: Good But Not That Good
JB Hi-Fi: Good But Not That Good
On a recent Saturday morning I wandered up to JB Hi-Fi looking for a new sound system. Two hours later I was climbing into a cab with a new sound system, new television and a nice new iMac on which I’m now writing this piece.
They get me every time. Every time they get me I see them getting everyone else – the place resembles a beehive of reckless consumer spending – and I think to myself ‘what a wonderful business, I’d love to own this’.
The good news is you can own JB Hi-Fi. Buying some shares is as simple as a few clicks of your mouse. Before you fire up the Commsec account, however, there are a few points to consider.
This type of ‘ground up’ investing is simple but can be devastatingly effective. It’s an area in which you can have a serious advantage over the fishbowl-dwelling professional investor. Typically, they’re basing their investment decisions off the financial statements, which are only ever a look at the past. You didn’t need an accounting degree to realise JB was going to be a sensational business five years ago, you just needed to walk around one of its original Melbourne stores and realise that this was a successful retail business that could be replicated all over the country.
Had you done so, you’d have made five times your money in the seven years since the company listed on the stock exchange in 2003. Not bad. Not bad at all. But how is today’s buyer going to fare?
Well, today’s $20 share price translates to a value for the entire business of approximately $2 billion. Now, two billion dollars is a lot of money. And, Australia is NOT a very big place. Armed with these two mind-boggling analytical insights, I’m prepared to posit that today’s buyer of JB Hi-Fi stands little chance of doing as well as their predecessor seven years ago.
Think about it this way. If JB’s share price even doubles over the next 7 years, it will have a market capitalisation of $4bn. Assuming the business is by then mature, you’d need it to be making something like $400m of pre-tax profit per year to justify this price tag. The company earns fairly consistent margins of 6%, so you’d need it to be generating more than $6bn in annual sales.
Australia’s total spending on household goods during the past 12 months was about $42bn. That includes furniture, whitegoods and all the bored-husband stuff you find at Bunnings Warehouse, none of which JB Hi-Fi sells.
Let’s say that in 7 years’ time total household goods spending has increased to $50bn. You’d need JB Hi-Fi to be collecting 13% of that in order to justify a $4bn price tag. That’s probably 30-40% of the market JB competes in.
Anything up to 100% is theoretically possible. But 30-40% market shares are rarely seen (unless you’re Coles and Woolies) and it’s certainly hard to imagine much upside from there.
Investing in retail businesses can be a highly profitable exercise. But you need to find them when they’re 10 or 20 stores and have a model that can be replicated up to 200 stores (I might post something on Kathmandu soon, is it a potential?). Buying a business like JB Hi-Fi, when everyone already knows about it, is more likely to lead to rags than riches.
Note: There’s an important aside here relating to retail businesses and return on capital. A good retailer doesn’t need much capital. JB’s $335m of inventory is almost offset by $290m of accounts payable – its suppliers are basically paying for everything in the store. So the economics can be absolutely mouth-watering. For the 2010 financial year, JB Hi-Fi’s return on equity was north of 40%. But a high historical ROE doesn’t necessarily justify a high price-to-earnings ratio. You can only justify a high multiple if you can get more capital into the business at the same high returns, and in a market the size of Australia, this is often a serious constraint.
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Can you provide any further details as to how you derive the 30-40% number? I've done the analysis bottom up instead of top down. If you look at their proposed store openings and couple this with some modest growth assumptions (in line with real GP) then they are doing $6b by FY2018. That also allows for the fact that their Tier 2 stores will do less volume than their Tier 1 stores.
Also dividends have not been factored in. If you assume dividends next year of $0.80 per share at current prices of around $19 that's 4% fully franked. That means to achieve iifunds hurdle of 8% the company only has to grow by 4% per year which means a 32% increase over seven years, not a doubling. Lastly the increase of total spending from $42b to $50b assumes growth of only 2.5% per year. That pretty much is in line with inflation which means the forecast assumes zero real growth over the next seven years which is overly conservative.
I agree that today's shareholder will not get anywhere near the returns of the past. However saying that investors will end up with rags is in my opinion hyperbolic. The key as always is the price the business and at current prices by my analysis the stock is trading at approximately fair value.
The 30-40% is a rough guess based on ABS data from 2001.
I agree with you, today's price is probably fair. I just don't think there's much chance of a better than expected outcome and some chance it's worse. And I didn't say it was going to lead to rags, I said more likely rags than riches.
Also note the negative store on store growth in this morning's numbers. I know it's a tough retail environment out there but this is often the first sign that a retail concept is starting to reach maturity.
Interesting read Steve, though I'm curious as to why TII has a long term buy on a more mature retailer like HVN. Applying the above logic, the company is even less likely to acheive the fantastic gains of JB past, something that we'd all like for our portfolio's.
From my reading of TII's HVN reviews, I would say that it is because they see the market price as currently undervaluing the HVN business. The rapid growth of JBs is likely part of that - people expect JBs to continue growing, the only way for that to happen is for them to eat HVN's lunch, so they opt out of HVN in favour of JBs.
If you instead see both companies as relatively mature retailers, then the discrepancy between price and value makes HVN a buying opportunity.
Correct me if i am wrong, but I am pretty sure that the return on capital figures are even better for The Reject Shop. Plus it has a wider audience (everyday discounts) to sell to and more room for further store roll outs than JBs. I get the same feeling Steve describes for JBs when I go into a reject shop, they are often 'buzzing'.
Tried to encourage TII to have a look at it back in July 2008 when the stock was marked down for sale, alas I was declined.
I believe it has since kicked some more goals operationally and run up another 75% or so - albeit with the current valuation pricing in more good times ahead.
Will JBH achieve 5-fold returns over the next 7 years? Unlikely.
However, is it still a good business to invest in at current prices?
They currently have 141 JBH branded stores with plans to roll out 210 in total and plans to roll out 18 new stores in 2011.
If 141 is reaching saturation, then 210 as a target looks very optimistic.
I also tend to think that a 50bn estimate of household goods spending in 7 years too conservative. As Don suggests, this is only 2.5% growth per year. Does this factor in new technologies like iPads and who knows what in coming years? Look at how JBH expanded into LCD & Plasma screens, PCs, Ipods and mobile phones. I can't see any reason why JBH can't grab 30-40% of market share.
Negative store-on-store growth is fairly understandable in this environment, but certainly no reason to give up on JBH.
Overall, I still think JBH has some good growth left in it.
If the benchmark for "better than expected outcome" is "doubles over the next 7 years" i.e. Total shareholder return of 14% compounded then I agree there's not much chance of better than expected. However in current conditions I challenge anyone to find a company that is expected to deliver to the upside benchmarked against 14% compounded annual return. On the other hand if we use a benchmark of say 8% I think the upside potential is much greater than the downside potential. The company is in my opinion one of the great retail success stories.
The cost of doing business is the lowest in the country and compares very favorably to giants such as Walmart. If somebody wanted to place a bet that total shareholder return would be less than 8% over the next seven years I would book that all day every day and sleep very easy at night.
Survivorship bias.
Your message appears to be quite simple: the share price of JB Hifi has gone up 5 fold, and if you buy today, you are unlikely to do better than this in 5 years.
For value investors interested in buying a stream of future income at a reasonable price, what is the relevance of your message above?
"Reasonable price" - you said it Peter. If the price is only reasonable on the basis that tomorrows growth will be the same as yesterdays, then your "stream of future income" runs the real risk of not meeting your expectations.
Or said another way, you'll be paying for yesterdays growth.
Where can I obtain more information on JB -Hi Hi roll out programme
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