Bristlemouth: A Value Investing Blog
January 16, 2012

Narrowneck and Clear Head on QBE

Narrowneck and Clear Head on QBE

I spent Saturday night in the Blue Mountains, about an hour west of Sydney. Unlike the sensible people on this cold, wet, foggy night, I wasn’t perched next to a fire with a good book. I was in a trail running race, the 20km Narrowneck Night Run.

Last year, the sunset views from the Narrowneck ridge were spectacular. This year you couldn’t see 10 metres in front of you. About 14km in it was pitch black and my headlamp worked like the high-beam lights on your car; in the fog I couldn’t see a metre in front of me.

It’s a strangely conducive environment for thinking. The field of runners spreads out until you can’t see any headlamps in front of you and can’t hear anyone behind. There’s the sound of your own feet, instinct alone landing them securely on the gravel, sight unseen. The only other sounds were some light drizzle and heavier breathing. So I start thinking about What We’re Missing on QBE.

And it strikes me that it was a bit of a silly post. The QBE argument is not about the numbers. It’s about management, faith in management and the current loss of faith in management. All of a sudden, I could see myself sitting on the other side of the argument.

For the most part, serial acquirers end up blowing up. From Centro, Allco and Babcock and Brown to ABC Learning and Transpacific, we’ve done a great job identifying them and giving them a wide berth. Where we’ve bent the rules, we’ve usually come off second best. Look no further than Photon Group.

Why is QBE any different? If we’d long been skeptical of this company and its hundreds of acquisitions, would we view the current profit woes as a buying opportunity? Or would we see it as evidence of the acquisition-binge coming unstuck? Perhaps the later, would be my guess, had we started on the opposite side of the fence.

There’s no guarantee that QBE’s woes this year are all catastrophe related. That’s what they tell us, of course, but it’s been the perfect year to brush all sorts of problems under the carpet. The line between catastrophe claims and ‘normal’ insurance claims is not a clear one.

Instead of one bad year, as we’ve been assuming, perhaps QBE’s underwriting standards have deteriorated, its latest acquisitions are duds and shareholders are going to wear the consequences for years to come. Management hubris could well exacerbate the problem.

How do we tell if this is indeed the case? The crucial test for me is how QBE’s competitors’ results compare. As they report over the next month or so, I’ll be lining them up against QBE. If this really has been the year from hell for global insurance companies, they should all be suffering equally. As one of the world’s best (that’s our thesis at least), QBE’s combined operating ratio of 96 should still be better than its peers. If it’s not, we’ve got a lot more thinking to do.

All of a sudden lights, voices and the smell of a barbeque appeared out of the fog blanket in front of me. I crossed the line 10th 11th in 96 minutes. Not bad. Running definitely helps my thinking; perhaps thinking helps my running as well?

PS Sunday night was a much more civilised evening at the theatre. If you’re Sydney based, get yourself along to A History of Everything as part of the Sydney Festival. It is brilliant.

Comments

January 16, 2012

Many thanks for this great post.

I recently bought a small piece of QBE and will be interested to see how the story unfolds in the next few months.

Best,
Tom

Andrew
January 16, 2012

On the original question, I think there's only been one thing missing on QBE from II's analysis, and the answer comes from The Black Swan. As Taleb argues, insurance companies usually only have big downsides, not upsides. Unlike utilities, a generous yield may not be enough reward for the considerable downside. You need to wait until it looks like an absolute no-brainer (and set strict portfolio limits). For those not yet holding the stock, I wouldn't wait too long, the time has come.

Igor
January 17, 2012

I recently bought a big stake in QBE. Definitely contrary to your portfolio limit advice but hey I'm comfortable with it and I recall Warren Buffett's comment re Geico when he initially bough this stock for his partnership 'it represented 70% of the holdings, but I wish I could have bough more'.
I think this is almost like that - I'm betting (maybe wrong word here as I think odds as in my favour) 28% of my portfolio on this - but hey the time is the friend of a good business so let's sit and wait now - maybe also pray for less catastrophes :-)

Gareth Brown (TII)
January 18, 2012

Hi Igor. I certainly don’t want to tell you how to run your portfolio (and can’t legally anyway), but I thought you might appreciate a point I learned the hard way. Several times in my early investing career I lost a lot of money buying stocks that ‘felt’ similar to early Buffett investments. They turned out to be very different. I picked a few winners that way too but the point stands that QBE in 2012 is probably very different from 1950s/60s GEICO.
Nowadays, when I catch myself noting rhyming between a past Buffett or Klarman investment and something I’m currently looking at, an internal alarm goes off warning me to be extra careful. It’s a short cut that can lead one astray or into taking too big a swing at an individual opportunity.

January 18, 2012

I may not have my facts straight, here, but my recollection is that Buffett's big investment in Geico was a capital injection into the company. Gareth, you might remember better than me. If so, his very investment made it a safer proposition - a different situation than simply buying QBE shares on the market.
I've been buying in recent days, too but have kept it to a comfortable single digit percentage at this stage.

Rouvin Mahdeva
January 18, 2012

Every stock has its day in the sun but the sun always sets .
Is this the case with QBE ?
Is it too big to manage safely and diligently , OPTIMALLY ???
l , personally , suspect such might be the case .
Rouvin .

Eswaran Waran
January 18, 2012

Greg,

You were the initial TII guy for QBE.
From what I remember you had it as a buy at < 18 and long term buy even at higher prices. A strong buy was at 15. How is it that after all this time you have still only got single digit percentage position in this company.
By the way, are you returning to TII reporting staff ?.

Es

Dave Sinclair
January 19, 2012

Isn't there an Investor's College article titled "Why strong buy doesn't mean load up", or something like that? The answer to your question is likely to be there.

January 20, 2012

That's it, Dave. Take for example one of the last pieces I published on the stock in February last year. At $18, we recommended QBE have an allocation of 'up to 7%'. So, if the rest of your portfolio had remained the same, at today's prices, QBE would be closer to 4% - leaving plenty of room to top up and still be in single digit percentage weighting. We're all hoping for a repeat of our initially gruelling but eventually rewarding experience with stocks like Flight Centre and RHG on this one. Let's see how we go...

Bruce
January 19, 2012

GI companies are best assessed comparing market cap to NTA. QBE has heaps of goodwill which reduces its net assets from 10b+ to around 5b. Market cap of 12b suggest 2.4ish times NTA which is not cheap. As a multiple of book value of around 11b it is about 1.1 which is not expensive. QBE depends on aquisitions for growth hence goodwill will increase more over time. Looks cheap comparing historical share prices, you are now buying at 2005 prices. Best to do a DCF projection and look at scenarios of what may transpire. You may end up buying the stock. Written by an actuary but this is not actuarial advice!

Robert P
January 19, 2012

It is possible to analyse the figures for QBE on the success of aquisitions. There are a number of methods. Look at ROE, and change. Use Simmon's IP- Essentially The increase in profit/(change in Investment). Look at ROC for different periods, or calculate something similar to IP but based on capital. Perhaps to compensate for 'disasters' use two or three years (or even four) instead of a single one. It is also possible to use a least squares (polynomial) curve fit (or similar) before calculating the chosen measure. I looked at my database and the eps growth has not been good. At this stage I do not intend to buy QBE and so I have no interest in obtaining the data and performing the calculations.

Andrew Brown
January 20, 2012

If you mix Bruce and Robert's comments together, you get to one of the cruxes of the matter on QBE. Management try to manage the business as a "smooth EPS growth" company. I'm a strong believer that in insurance, you can't do that, since every once in a while, you get the total unexpected happening - bad but also really good. What's Buffett's quote - I'd rather have a lumpy 15% return than a smooth 12% return. Hence, I try to invest in insurers which manage on a GROWTH IN BOOK VALUE basis - there are none in Australia. (It's why I love the Soul Patts group since that's in essence what they do - try not to lose money but once in a while deliver an outrageous one off profit from a long term play). QBE's problem now is that they have paid out in dividends a significant proportion of the goodies from a very profitable period of reserve releases. That's not good capital management in my view, and led to the questioning of the conservatism of capital adequacy by analysts well over a year ago. The QBE Board needs a bit of self examination on this subject as I think the thinking may have become a bit insular (don't change what's not broken, long standing management etc.). That's one of the less discussed risks with this company IMHO.

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